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n the last years, there has been an explosive growth of the
Internet in terms of both the number of users and the
transmitted volume of data. It is interesting to note that
the aggregate volume of data circulated in the Internet is
expected to increase with an annual growth of 30 percent for
the next years [1] while the lowest demanded capacity by the
end-users is doubled almost every two years [2]. Therefore,
there is an increasing need for bandwidth resulting in new
access methods.
In the case of access networks based on copper, there are sev-
eral inherent technical and physical limitations setting barriers
to performance such as maximum distance, bandwidth, and
number of concurrent customers. On the other hand, access net-
works based on optical fibers are the only future-proof solution
able to handle future demands [3], since the transmission capa-
bilities of fiber are theoretically unlimited providing high data
rates, low loss, and low distortion.
According to European Commission “Next generation access
networks (NGAs) mean wired access networks which consist
wholly or in part of optical elements and which are capable of
delivering broadband access services with enhanced characteris-
tics (such as higher throughput) as compared to those provided
over already existing copper networks. In most cases NGAs are
the result of an upgrade of an already existing copper or coaxial
access network” [4]. Therefore, according to the EC two tech-
nologies are assumed as NGAs, fiber to the cabinet (FTTCab)
and fiber to the home/building (FTTH/B). 
There has been extensive discussion regarding NGA in
recent years; however, the high cost of the development of
NGA, in combination with the high uncertainties mainly on
demand and revenues (which induce corresponding uncertain-
ty on investment returns) and restrain service providers from
investing in NGAs [5]. From this perspective, this article aims
to identify, quantify, evaluate, and discuss the risk characteris-
tics of the NGA.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Initially the
regulation framework regarding NGAs is presented. Techno-
logical options are illustrated. We report regulatory options
related to NGAs and discuss the modeling assumptions.
Results regarding the total risk are presented. Some conclud-
ing remarks are then given. 
NGA Regulation and Policy Framework
Various policies are discussed and have been followed in order
to overcome the uncertainty related to the deployment of NGA
networks. The United States provided a regulatory holiday to
two (geographically separated) operators in order to build their
NGA networks, while other countries (mainly in Asia) have pre-
ferred the state-aid solution toward firms investing in NGAs. 
The European Commission (EC) issued a Recommenda-
tion on regulated access to NGA [4] in order to provide
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) with guidelines for
tackling the trade-off between fostering competition and pro-
moting investments with regard to NGAs. 
In particular, the EC Recommendation is in accordance
with Europe’s overall regulation regime since it proposes that
the access fees for any wholesale products should be based on
a cost-based form. 
This holds for any wholesale access product irrespective of
whether it falls in the scope of the market for wholesale physi-
cal network infrastructure (usually named Market 4) or the
wholesale broadband access (Market 5). 
However, the EC Recommendation introduced the term of
risk premium that should be included in the calculation of the
costs of the wholesale access fees in order to compensate the
investor1 for any additional and quantifiable risks incurred
when investing in NGA networks. The principles of this pre-
mium calculation are described in detail in a special annex of
the EC Recommendation. More specifically, this premium
should reflect:
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• Uncertainty relating to retail and wholesale demand
• Uncertainty relating to the costs of deployment, civil engineer-
ing works and managerial execution
• Uncertainty relating to technological progress
• Uncertainty relating to market dynamics and the evolving com-
petitive situation, such as the degree of infrastructure-based
and/or cable competition
• Macroeconomic uncertainty
It is worth mentioning that the incumbent operators usually
claim that there is another risk factor called regulatory risk,
which is related to the regulator’s limited ability to make ex-
ante credible commitments.
NGA Architectures Set by the EC
Recommendation
Although several architectures of access networks have
already been proposed, including wireless ones, the EC pro-
posed only fixed ones and always based on fiber [7]. In this
article four alternative architectures are modeled and studied.
One is fiber to the curb (FTTC) with very high rate digital
subscriber line (VDSL), and the other three are FTTH.
FTTC with VDSL
Regarding the FTTC architecture, the path from the service
provider’s point of presence (POP) to the intermediate node
(street cabinet) that serves an entire neighborhood exclusively
consists of optical fiber (Fig. 1). A switch (digital subscriber
line access multiplexer — DSLAM), placed on the street cabi-
net, is connected to the POP of the service provider via a
fiber or a pair of optical fibers carrying the aggregated traffic
from the neighborhood traffic usually through Gigabit Ether-
net. The access of each end user up to the switch of the street
cabinet is realized using the standard copper cables used for
the PSTN network and VDSL technology over copper cables.
Depending on both the technology and the distance, end users
experience symmetric or asymmetric data rates of up 100
Mb/s, depending on the copper length.
The FTTC architecture provides to the incumbent the
advantage to connect its subscribers to existing copper cable
infrastructure in the first mile. Additionally, it has lower capi-
tal requirements since the NGA investment is done only in
part of the access network. However, it has limited time frame
since there is a need for capacity doubling every two years.
Fiber to the Home Scenarios
According to the FTTH architecture, the path from the ser-
vice provider’s point of presence (POP) to the end user exclu-
sively consists of optical fiber (Fig. 1). The fiber is terminated
inside the home or workplace of the end user. Therefore,
each device at the subscriber premises is connected through a
dedicated optical fiber to a switch port located at POP or to
the optical splitter which in turn connects to the POP via a
single feeder fiber. 
Three FTTH technologies are mature enough to use in an
NGA investment. The choice of each technology depends on
the type of the transmitted service, the infrastructure cost, the
existing infrastructure and future plans towards new technolo-
gies.
Gigabit Passive Optical Network — In passive optical net-
works (PONs), each customer is connected to the optical net-
work via a passive optical splitter. The advantages of an
FTTH PON [8] are related to:
• The use of purely passive components between the central
office and the end user
• Less requirements for fiber investment in the network seg-
ment LEX-outdoor cabinet
• Less space requirements inside the LEX since less fibers
and thinner trenches are terminated at the LEX. The above
issues lead to lower maintenance and operational costs.
However, there are a number of disadvantages related to
the GPON:
• Since a number of users (16–32 or a maximum of 64) share
the capacity traveling over just one fiber, there are limita-
tions on the maximum capacity per user.
• Due to the above, since there is congestion among the vari-
ous users, it is mandatory to have resource protocols to run
between LEX and users as well as to have more advanced
customer premises equipment (CPE), such as burst
receivers, compared to simpler CPE required for pure
point-to-point (P2P) connections.
• The unbundling is limited by physical network resources.
The optical line termination (OLT) is the basic element of
the network. It is usually placed at the central office (CO) and
is the driving force of FTTH systems. The optical network
units (ONUs) are placed close to the end user. ONUs are
connected to the OLT through optical fiber without using
intermediate active components (Fig. 1). 
Point-to-Point — Active Ethernet, also known as Ethernet
switched optical (ESON) or P2P network, provides a dedicat-
ed optical fiber from the outdoor active equipment to each
end user. In the case of P2P, operation, management, and
maintenance as well as calculation of the power budget are
greatly simplified due to the existence of this dedicated fiber.
Core switch, aggregation, switch and the optical network ter-
minal (ONT) are the main components of a P2P network
(Fig. 1). Beyond the advantage of P2P offering almost maxi-
Figure 1. Examined architectures.
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1 It should be noted that the EC Recommendation tacitly implies that the
incumbent will invest in NGAs, and the alternative operators will be the
access seekers. OPTA [6] also argues that the prospective investors in
NGA networks are in large part former incumbent operators.
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mum capacity (100 Mb/s or 1 Gb/s signal in a 100
BaseFX or 1000 BaseLX) to each end user, there
is a main disadvantage: it requires the maximum
invested capital since a fiber pair is dedicated to
each user. Therefore, a large space for the ODFs
inside the LEX should be available as in the case
of copper networks, and the trenches (especially
closer to the LEX) are expected to be wider (more
complex and costly). 
Point to Point Ethernet — In the P2P Ethernet (P2PE) scenario
a first aggregation switch is located in the cabinet between the
central office and the user premises. The architecture is simi-
lar to the one of GPON with the difference that there is
active equipment in the cabinet (Fig. 1). This technology
seems to accommodate the pros and cons of all other tech-
nologies:
• Requires power in the field
• Might offer higher capacity per user that FTTC/VDSL and
GPON but in any case lower than the maximum provided
by the pure P2P technology
The specific technology could be the migration of a
FTTC/VDSL network since the power could be already avail-
able or of a GPON network since fiber is available and only
changes to outdoor cabinet should be performed.
NGA Regulatory Options
The Main NGA Risk Factor: The Risk of Future
Demand for New Fiber-Based Services 
Demand and penetration are the main factors which cause
risks related to NGA investments [9]. The higher the penetra-
tion of the potential customer base is, the higher the prof-
itability of the investment becomes. Moreover, if the
penetration does not reach the critical mass that is required
for the creation of the new fiber-based services market, the
NGA investment may not even be profitable at all. 
There are three factors that influence the penetration of
the new fiber-based services. First, the existence of competing
NGA fiber network platforms, such as cable networks, increas-
es the risk of both penetration and investor’s market share. In
particular, the higher the degree of facilities-based competi-
tion is, the higher the risk of both penetration and investor’s
market share becomes. Secondly, the co-existence of a remain-
ing copper network DSL platform and a new fiber NGA plat-
form increases the risk of the future demand for the new
fiber-based services. In particular, the higher the migration
period from copper-based services towards NGA-based ser-
vices, the higher the risk of the penetration of the new NGA-
based services. Last, but not least, the risk of sufficient
willingness to pay (WTP) increases the risk of future demand
for new fiber-based services.
Although, it is expected that the WTP for the new services
will be higher than the WTP for the existing services since the
former offer improved characteristics, such as better quality
and higher data rate, it is doubtful that this increase in con-
sumers’ WTP will be sufficient for recovering the high invest-
ment cost.
Regulatory Policy 
A regulator’s goal is twofold. First, it aims to encourage
investments in order to promote innovation and market
growth; second, to foster competition in the retail market in
order to ensure lower prices, better quality, and higher social
welfare. Taking into account that the EC recommendation
sets a predetermined framework to follow, and that in any
case a regulatory holiday is not a desirable option, a Euro-
pean regulator has many different means in order to affect
both investments and competition. Initially, the regulator
should decide about the regulatory regime (e.g. access levels
and corresponding wholesale access products, etc). According
to the above decision, the regulator should then decide about
specific parameters of the regulatory policy, such as the regu-
latory period (i.e., the interval between two reviews of the reg-
ulatory policy), the risk premium and other complementary
regulatory options (e.g. adoption of risk sharing schemes,
adoption of a transparent framework for the migration path
from copper to fiber-based networks, etc). 
The impact of each decision on investment and competition
varies significantly. Some regulators are in favor of encourag-
ing investments more than fostering competition. Therefore,
there is a trade-off between promoting investments and fos-
tering competition. In any case, regulatory certainty is expect-
ed to promote investment in NGA. This requires the
regulator’s ex ante commitment to its decisions for a long
period, the economic lifetime of an NGA investment, but
especially in the first and most crucial time period. 
In the following analysis, it has been assumed that NRAs
adopt and implement the EC Recommendation on regulated
access to NGA. Therefore, the access to wholesale physical
network infrastructure (Market 4) as well as, the wholesale
broadband access (Market 5) should be mandated and cost-
oriented. In addition, NRAs should be able to calculate and
include a higher risk premium to reflect any additional and
quantifiable investment risk incurred by the investor. This risk
premium should be incorporated into the weighted average
cost of capital (WACC) calculation for setting the price of
access to the unbundled copper loop. 
Techno-Economic Model
Risk Calculation
The tool used in this study is the ECOSYS techno-economic
tool, which has been used in the evaluations of various wire-
less and wireline access technologies. The application of the
model relies on its database, where the cost figures of the var-
ious network components are kept and constantly updated
from data gathered from the biggest European telecommuni-
cation companies. Further information can be found in [5].
The outputs of this model are:
• The investments undertaken by the incumbent 
• The unit costs of the various retail and wholesale products
• The risk premium associated with the specific investment
In order to make the above calculations, the tool creates a
modeled NGA network in a bottom-up (BU) long run incre-
mental cost (LRIC) approach. BU stands for the approach of
creating the appropriate scale/footprint of the network that
the foreseen demand requires. Therefore, proper dimension-
ing rules are followed to tailor the necessary type and volume
of components to the expected services’ demand. The LRIC
approach mainly means that the only the NGA increment is
modeled, and no other network that might be complementary
to NGA (e.g., a leased line core network). For the first two of
Table 1. Area characteristics.
Area Buildingsper cabinet
Floors per
building
Apartments
per building
Density threshold
(customers/km2)
DU 20 4 4 9000
U 32 4 2 1000
S 36 2 1 500
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the above outputs, the volumes of the necessary components
are calculated based on the demand, and the unit costs of the
various necessary components are used. For the last calcula-
tion which is the risk premium, it is necessary to account
future cash flows according to the recommendation. There-
fore, assumptions for the revenues and their evolution over
time should be made.
By combining the revenues and expenditures sides, namely
service revenues, investments, operating costs and general
economic inputs (e.g., discount rate, tax rate), the tool calcu-
lates the results necessary for discounted cash flow (DCF)
analysis such as cash flows, net present values (NPVs), inter-
nal rate of return (IRR), payback period and other economic
figure of merits for the NGA investor. The risk factor, which
is the main output parameter that will be presented in the fol-
lowing sections, is defined as the difference the standard (tra-
ditional) WACC minus the IRR of the NGA project following
discussion in [9]. 
Total NGA risk factor = Traditionally defined operator
WACC – the IRR of the NGA project
This is called total risk, and it should not be misinterpreted
as the risk premium reported in the recommendation. The
total risk refers to how much higher should the IRR of an
NGA project be than the traditional WACC of an operator
(which is based on all other operator’s activities, mainly tradi-
tional ones: voice, access, leased lines, etc.). In the following
paragraphs, the total risk to which the operator will be
exposed if making the decision to implement an NGA is cal-
culated and discussed for the four scenarios studied.
Modeling Assumptions
The model calculates all the necessary costs and revenues the
incumbent will face if it makes the decision to implement an
NGA in an area that is served from one central office. Each
area according to its density (customers/square km) is charac-
terized as dense urban (DU), urban (U), or suburban (S), and
for each area there are different assumptions concerning the
number of buildings and other geographical parameters pre-
sented in Table 1.
The incumbent offers services to both retail and wholesale
broadband markets. The project’s study period is set to 20
years, beginning in 2011. For the first 10 years of the analysis
full dimensioning of costs and revenues is performed. Howev-
er, for the next 10 years the following assumptions have been
used, since it is very difficult to make long-term estimations
and prognoses. The cost of investments was assumed to
remain at the same levels as in the last three years (7th–10th
year) of the analysis. For both revenues and running costs a
linear estimation was performed, taking into account again
the last three years.
The WACC pre-tax has been assumed as 10.5 percent
(defined as a mean value among European incumbent opera-
tors), and it has also been used as the discount factor in the
DCF analysis.
As far as the broadband products offered and the forecast-
ed revenues, the following assumptions have been used. Two
retail products (lower and higher) offered by the NGA
investor were modeled (30 Mb/s and 50 Mb/s for FTTC, and
75 Mb/s and 100 Mb/s for FTTH scenarios). Two correspond-
ing wholesale broadband products (wholesale broadband
access [WBA] or bitstream) were assumed to offer to the
access seekers. For simplicity reasons their price was set at
retail – 20 percent, but it is possible to set them at a cost-ori-
ented level (with or without risk premium). Moreover, whole-
sale physical access products were assumed to be priced at
cost-oriented level without premium.2 The mix of WBA and
physical access products is 50–50 percent. It is assumed that
the NGA investor has an initial NGA retail market share of
90 percent, which in the 10th year has been reduced to 70
percent due to competitive pressure by access seekers. The
revenue has been assumed almost constant during the time
period examined. This is consistent with the approach fol-
lowed by almost all operators and in almost all countries to
keep the same revenue and offer higher speed to consumers
or make some offers over time. A 2 percent tariff yearly
reduction has been assumed due to these offers. 
Results
As a first step in the analysis, a total number of ten geograph-
ic areas have been selected with 320.000 potential subscribers
in total. Three of them were characterized as DU, five as U
and the rest three as S. The model calculated the total risk for
the case that the incumbent operator decides to deploy the
same architecture solution to all the areas for all 4 architec-
tures. 
Negative total risk means that the IRR of the NGA project
itself is higher than the traditionally calculated WACC of the
operator-investor, thus the NGA project can be considered as
profitable as the current (traditional) investment. In other
words negative or even small positive but close to zero values
indicate that the risk of the specific scenario is rather mini-
mal. Obviously, for the 3 FTTH scenarios this profitability can
be observed only after many years of operation, verifying all
worldwide discussion about the risks entailed to the
FTTH/NGA investment. The launching period of FTTH/NGA
operation is the most crucial since it is characterized by high
risks, due to all parameters already discussed, and mainly to
low penetration, adoption, or demand. Therefore, it is verified
how strategic the role of the regulator is during this first NGA
operation interval. The regulatory decisions taken ex ante
(i.e., during this first NGA operation interval) should be the
optimum in order to avoid altering this risk profile and per-
haps worsening it.
As can be seen in Fig. 2, the three FTTH architectures
have more or less the same risk, and the FTTC scenario is sig-
nificantly better. It is worth mentioning that FTTC/VDSL2
has much less risk than the others due to the lower capital
required to invest (mainly less trenching). Therefore, the fre-
2 Different pricing schemes can be evaluated, but such an analysis is
beyond this article’s scope.
Figure 2. Total risk for all architectures.
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quent comment of incumbent operators that FTTC/VDSL2
entails significant risks loses its validity especially when com-
pared to the other technologies. It is worth mentioning that
profitability of this FTTC/VDSL scenario is achieved in less
than five years. This is attributed mainly to the highly urban
nature of the selected mix of areas modeled. Risks of
FTTC/VDSL2 investment are considerably reduced in dense
urban and urban areas. 
Figure 3 focuses on FTTH architectures only, while the
study period is limited to only the first 10 years. It is worth
mentioning that the risk levels of the three FTTH technolo-
gies are more or less the same, although their pros/cons pro-
files are different. This indicates that a more detailed analysis
should be followed, and special attention should be paid
regarding the cost assumptions for each of GPON, P2P, and
P2PE technologies. Beyond FTTCab/VDSL2, which has in
general less risk, there should be careful calculation for risk
associated with FTTH technologies. In case of any FTTH
technology for a time interval of the investment at 10 years, a
minor but positive value less than 3 percent is occurring (Fig.
3). This can be interpreted as profitable within a 10-year peri-
od, even for those risky investments and despite the usual util-
ity-like investments that are profitable beyond the time period
of 20 years. However, this medium-term profitability can be
secured when a number of contributing factors hold cumula-
tively:
• A relative revenue (i.e., average revenue per user [ARPU])
stability over time during this time interval; that is, no price
war situations among access providers and access seekers
• Rollout cost reduction by strategies like co-investment
among access providers, access seekers, and possibly other
parties, state/municipality facilitation, and so on
• Regulatory stability and close monitoring relaxing in case of
the pertinent risk profile
• Demand aggregation by state aid or even facilitation
In particular, the regulators face a big dilemma for the
FTTH cases. If they follow the recommendation they have to
calculate a risk factor that probably will be high. This factor
must be used to reward the NGA investor; as a result, this
risk premium would raise the unit cost (i.e., the tariffs of both
retail and wholesale services). If these tariffs are set initially at
high prices, the demand for these prices should face even
more risk and might lead the NGA investment to a total sunk
cost with fewer possibilities of profitability. If they do not fol-
low the recommendation regarding the cost orientation basis
(which is not easy to prove to the EC), alternative schemes
should be invented. For example:
• The retail tariffs can be set by the operators according to
their own commercial policies, which might accept short-
term losses in order to gain a wider customer base or in an
anchor pricing form [10].
• Wholesale prices can be set on a retail-minus basis or other
alternatives indicated by the European Regulatory Frame-
work and common practices.
However, these strategies can easily lead to price wars, which
at the end of the day might push all operators to limited prof-
itability (or even into the negative).
At the next step, a new scenario was created in which the
incumbent implements a mixed roll-out scenario deploying
FTTH/GPON in the three DU areas and FTTC/VDSL in the
rest seven areas. With this solution the incumbent avoids
using the costly FTTH technology in areas with low customer
density and reuses part of the already installed copper net-
work. The total risk for the incumbent-investor was calculated
and the results are presented at Fig. 4.
As expected, the risk calculated falls between the cases of
pure FTTH-GPON and VDSL scenarios. The risk of this
investment scheme is significantly lower than the GPON one.
The total risk seems to be close to zero in about four years
time, indicating higher possibility to project profitability. This
indicates that the optimum strategy by the investing operator
shouldn’t follow just one technology. On contrary, and as
expected, in areas with low expected demand and/or customer
purchasing power risky investments should avoided. Regula-
tors’ challenges in these cases are related towards ensuring
access of all consumers and access seekers to all technolo-
gies/areas perhaps by geographical remedies. 
Finally, in order to further clarify the parameters that affect
the total risk a sensitivity analysis was made in the risk value
of the above modeled scenario at the 10th year. The impact of
some critical parameters (such as the revenues, the penetra-
tion and the cost for digging and constructing the network,
not the equipment cost) was examined. In sensitivity analysis
each parameter is changed in order to study the impact that
the changes in each parameter have to the output variable
(while the others remain constant). The results are presented
at Fig. 5. Each parameter was changed within an interval of
±20 percent of their initially assumed values. The most
important impact is that of the revenue followed by the pene-
tration and, finally, the digging cost. It should be denoted that
if the case was purely FTTH the impact of the digging cost
would be significantly higher. This result regarding the impact
of revenue on risk confirms our previous discussion in Fig. 3
about the important role of ARPU stability over time in an
NGA environment. Anything that could contribute to avoid-
ance of a price war in NGA environment would be welcome
(regulatory or not, e.g., state aid ). Price wars have been a
Figure 3. Total risk for FTTH architectures.
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common practice in many sectors including traditional tele-
coms; however, price wars in the NGA era would likely
push/force every involved actor to exit the market.
Conclusions
The risk profile of NGA investments has been quantified,
analyzed, and discussed under different scenarios for the first
time according to our knowledge. It seems that FTTC/VDSL2
does not have a significant risk profile due to its high reuse of
a significant portion of the existing copper public switched
telephone network (PSTN). This investment is expected to be
profitable in less than five years, although some incumbent
operators claim high risk for this technology as well. 
All FTTH technologies have more or less the same risk
profile, but further examination is required. The risk profile
of all is very high during the launching period but reduces to
almost zero after about a decade. This means that the NGA
investment has lower duration than utility-like investments,
but its risk is high, especially in the first years of operation. 
Taking into account the above, it is crucial for all involved
parties (operators, regulators, EC, states, etc.) to understand
all these risk factors of the NGA investment itself. The NGA
risk forces all to cooperate in order to minimize it; otherwise,
there will be no NGA at all. The access seekers should not
based only on regulator’s remedies to keep their operations in
an NGA environment. Even in the worst case for NGA
investor regime (cost-orientation with premium) the access-
seekers have to pay high access price. Therefore, they should
not follow a price war policy in the retail market. 
The NGA investor should benefit from a risk premium but
this premium should not be too high otherwise it will kill its
retail price too. In a NGA environment the operators cannot
continue their policy that they have used to in the current
business environment. On contrary they should share their
risk. The EC recommendation offers a number of tools but
unfortunately some of these (like cost-orientation combined
to risk-premium) possibly does not lead to risk relax, while
some others do facilitate the risk sharing.
Credibly, the regulators should be in a position to accept a
long-term NGA policy with close monitoring and perhaps
other policies/tools beyond standard cost-orientation approach
(at least for a temporal/transition period).
The EC, which issued the NGA recommendation, must
understand there are many practical details resulting from
what is described in this recommendation. The cost orien-
tation combined with premium is leading to high wholesale
access prices. If retail prices are kept below these whole-
sale access prices in order to attract a customer base, the
EC should accept that at least in the short term, predatory
pricing is a temporal sacrifice due to the well understood
NGA risk. Unfortunately, this NGA recommendation does
not consider the details in such cases, and perhaps could
deserve further review. But fortunately, the EC NGA rec-
ommendation depicts that risk sharing is accepted. The
risk sharing via co-investment or other schemes should be
the basis for the NGA operators (investors and access
seekers)
The Member States may play the most important role since
they can make higher- or lower-grade interventions for facili-
tation of NGA deployment. For example, these interventions
could include proposals for state-aid measures regarding
NGA deployment, facilitation measures such as demand stim-
ulation/subsidization, network facilitation such as relaxation
on the rights of way, and so on. Some of the above NGA risks
could be waived (at least partially) after a successfully
designed measure initiated by a State or an arm of it.
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